Is the argument here that prosecuting Chinese spies is important enough that, in order to enable a prosecution with odd paperwork requirements, the government should have testified that China was a threat to the national security of the UK, whether or not they believed that was true?
Or is it that China was (is?) indeed a threat to the national security of the UK? (If so, what is the nature of the threat?)
You've made a strong argument that the relevant parties (1) did not believe China was an active threat to national security, and (2) did not want to admit publicly to holding this nonbelief. How much of a scandal is that?
(Political relevance disclosure: I'm an American and possess absolutely no relevance to British politics or British politicians.)
There is clearly something serious here about how this case was handled and how it has now been described. The CPS letter does raise real and uncomfortable questions.
But I think O’Brien’s argument goes too far in a couple of important ways:
1. He treats the refusal to label China an “enemy” as deliberate sabotage. Yet the avoidance of that designation has been a long-standing, cross-party diplomatic and security position. To present this ambiguity as evidence of intent goes a good deal further than the text of the letter itself supports.
2. O’Brien’s article moves from documented inconsistencies to conclude there is clearly evidence of active lying and sabotage, but without establishing intent. The CPS letter tells us what happened, but it does not yet tell us why. Bridging that gap requires evidence that is not currently available.
So, the balanced reading, for me (as a constituent of Neil O’Brien), is this:
Yes, the Government still has serious explaining to do about the timeline and the contradictions.
But the leap to the claim that “the Government sabotaged a prosecution and then lied about it” is not proven on the present record.
If further disclosures shows that evidence was constrained for political convenience rather than legal or security reasons, then O’Brien’s strongest conclusions may well be justified. But as things stand, I am not convinced. My instinct is to slow down, and not let rhetoric outrun what has actually been demonstrated.
Is the argument here that prosecuting Chinese spies is important enough that, in order to enable a prosecution with odd paperwork requirements, the government should have testified that China was a threat to the national security of the UK, whether or not they believed that was true?
Or is it that China was (is?) indeed a threat to the national security of the UK? (If so, what is the nature of the threat?)
You've made a strong argument that the relevant parties (1) did not believe China was an active threat to national security, and (2) did not want to admit publicly to holding this nonbelief. How much of a scandal is that?
(Political relevance disclosure: I'm an American and possess absolutely no relevance to British politics or British politicians.)
This is so frustrating. It's just a non issue that nobody in the country out of the Westminster bubble cares about.
There is clearly something serious here about how this case was handled and how it has now been described. The CPS letter does raise real and uncomfortable questions.
But I think O’Brien’s argument goes too far in a couple of important ways:
1. He treats the refusal to label China an “enemy” as deliberate sabotage. Yet the avoidance of that designation has been a long-standing, cross-party diplomatic and security position. To present this ambiguity as evidence of intent goes a good deal further than the text of the letter itself supports.
2. O’Brien’s article moves from documented inconsistencies to conclude there is clearly evidence of active lying and sabotage, but without establishing intent. The CPS letter tells us what happened, but it does not yet tell us why. Bridging that gap requires evidence that is not currently available.
So, the balanced reading, for me (as a constituent of Neil O’Brien), is this:
Yes, the Government still has serious explaining to do about the timeline and the contradictions.
But the leap to the claim that “the Government sabotaged a prosecution and then lied about it” is not proven on the present record.
If further disclosures shows that evidence was constrained for political convenience rather than legal or security reasons, then O’Brien’s strongest conclusions may well be justified. But as things stand, I am not convinced. My instinct is to slow down, and not let rhetoric outrun what has actually been demonstrated.